



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

RECENT CASES.

BILLS AND NOTES — DEFENSES — FRAUD AS DEFENSE AGAINST INDORSEE: BURDEN OF PROOF. — The indorsee of a promissory note sued the maker, who pleaded that the note was procured from him by fraud and that the plaintiff was not a *bona fide* purchaser. *Held*, that the burden is on the plaintiff to show that he is a holder for value in good faith. *Cedar Rapids National Bank v. Myhre Bros.*, 107 Pac. 518 (Wash.).

For a discussion of the principles involved, see 23 HARV. L. REV. 640.

BILLS AND NOTES — INDORSEMENT — WHEN ASSIGNMENT OPERATES AS INDORSEMENT. — A note was transferred to the plaintiff with the words "I hereby assign my interest in this note," etc., written on the back. *Held*, that this is an assignment, not an indorsement. *Gale v. Mayhew*, 125 N. W. 781 (Mich.).

If the words used are "I assign this note," they have the effect of an indorsement. *Markey v. Corey*, 108 Mich. 184. But see *Briggs v. Latham*, 36 Kan. 205. But a distinction has been taken if the words "I assign my interest in this note" are used, since an indorsement involves more than a mere transfer of an interest. *Aniba v. Yeomans*, 39 Mich. 171. For a discussion of a case opposed to the principal case, see 12 HARV. L. REV. 566.

BILLS AND NOTES — OVERDUE PAPER — MATURITY UPON DEFAULT IN PAYMENT OF ONE OF SERIES. — The defendant gave the plaintiff a number of promissory notes, payable at different times, and secured by a chattel mortgage containing a clause that upon default in the payment of any of the notes the rest should immediately become due. The plaintiff recovered on several of the notes as they became due. Upon a subsequent default, the plaintiff again brought suit. *Held*, that the entire debt was due at the time of the first default, and the plaintiff's right of action was merged in his first judgment. *Banzer v. Richter*, 123 N. Y. Supp. 678 (Sup. Ct.).

For a discussion of a similar case reaching an opposite result, see 23 HARV. L. REV. 146.

BILLS AND NOTES — OVERDUE PAPER — PROMISE TO PAY ATTORNEY'S FEES. — An action was brought on a promissory note, containing a promise to pay ten per cent attorney's fees, if the note should be put into an attorney's hands for collection or suit. *Held*, that in order to recover on this promise the plaintiff must allege that he has paid, or contracted to pay, a certain amount for such services; and this amount will be the measure of his recovery. *Reed v. Taylor*, 120 S. W. 864 (Tex., Ct. Civ. App.).

The validity of a promise to pay attorney's fees is upheld by a small majority of the jurisdictions in this country. *Chestertown Bank of Maryland v. Walker*, 163 Fed. 510. *Contra*, *Exchange Bank v. Appalachian Land & Lumber Co.*, 128 N. C. 193. This majority is itself divided on the question of negotiability, the prevailing view being that such a note is negotiable. *Cudahy Packing Co. v. State Nat. Bank of St. Louis*, 134 Fed. 538. *Contra*, *Findlay v. Pott*, 131 Cal. 385. The argument against negotiability is that the amount of the note is uncertain, since it cannot be ascertained in advance whether an attorney will be employed, or, if so, what his charges will be. From this it appears that even when the amount of the fee is stipulated, the courts regard the promise as one of indemnity, and would limit recovery to the amount actually paid the attorney. Of those courts favoring negotiability, a few have decided squarely that this is a promise of indemnity. *Campbell v. Worman*, 58 Minn.